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In recent years contemporary analytic philosophers have increasingly turned their 
attention to the significance of sociality for various areas of philosophy.  While an older 
body of literature has sought to examine its implications for the plausibility of 
methodological individualism, and more generally for the priority of various forms of 
individualism or holism for the explanation of human activities,1 a more recent body of 
literature regarding sociality has focused instead on clarifying what it regards as certain 
core social phenomena such as conventions, collective intentionality, plural subjecthood, 
and we- or shared intentions.2  By contrast, philosophers working at the intersection of 
analytic and continental philosophy have emphasized the primacy of practice as the 
proper point of departure for how we should understand the nature and significance of 
sociality.3  Although this common emphasis is articulated in divergent ways, it is 
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and Hermeneutics”, in Review of Metaphysics 34 (1980), pp. 3-23; idem., Being-in-the-World (Cambridge, 
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invariably inspired by the works of the early Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein.  This 
emphasis on the primacy of practice is often framed, especially for those who try to 
understand and articulate the insights of the later Wittgenstein, in terms of the possibility 
of rule-following.  Thus, Peter Winch’s and Saul Kripke’s influential but provocative 
readings of the later Wittgenstein focus explicitly on Wittgenstein’s view of the nature of 
rule-following and seek to use it at least to sharpen certain philosophical problems, 
readings which have generated in turn wide-ranging interest and disagreement in 
contemporary philosophy about the significance of rule-following for understanding 
human activities.4   
In this essay I want to use some of the current literature concerning rule-following 
as a point of departure for sketching what I argue to be the proper understanding of the 
connection between practice and sociality.  First, I will single out and elaborate briefly 
one aspect of the views of Philip Pettit and Robert Brandom on the nature of rule-
following and its necessary dependence on social practices (putting aside any specific 
differences between them for this purpose).  Because Pettit’s and Brandom’s conceptual 
apparatuses are highly systematic and formidable, I can only extract and elaborate those 
elements of their views that are directly relevant for how to understand the connection 
between practice and sociality.  Second, I will compare Pettit’s and Brandom’s defense of 
the necessarily social basis of rule-following with the views of Theodore Schatzki and 
Joseph Rouse, whose conceptions of the connection between practice and sociality are 
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indebted as much to the early Heidegger as the later Wittgenstein.  Third and finally, in 
light of the work of Schatzki and Rouse, I will register a dissatisfaction with Pettit’s and 
Brandom’s claim that rule-following is only possible on the basis of our engagement in 
social practices.  But my main complaint is not that rule-following should not be 
understood in terms of engagement in social practices.  Rather, it is that Pettit and 
Brandom have not thought through and hence gone far enough in working out what is 
fully involved in acknowledging the necessarily social basis of rule-following.  More 
precisely, the suggestion is that practices are not only modes of activity, as Pettit and 
Brandom tend to conceive them, but constitute at a more basic level the concrete context 
or world on the basis of which practices qua modes of activity are intelligible at all.   
 
 
I. The Significance and Problem of Rule-Following 
 
Why is the issue of rule-following significant in the first place?  To begin with, 
philosophers are especially interested in rule-following because our capacity to follow 
rules at all – i.e., our capacity to deal with the world not only in causal, but normative 
terms – is fundamental to the way in which we deal with our environment in general.  
Rule-following in this sense goes far beyond perhaps its ordinary sense as the felt need or 
burden to conform to social pressure (e.g., the concern with satisfying social conventions, 
etc.).  It pertains rather to the very idea of what is involved in understanding or thinking 
anything at all.  Why must understanding or thinking involve rule-following?  Intuitively 
speaking, it is the platitude that whenever we encounter someone whom we treat as 
exhibiting understanding or thought, we make sense of her behavior by ascribing various 
beliefs, desires and the like to her and then seeing the extent to which her behavior can be 
understood as following or being guided by these beliefs, desires and the like that we 
have ascribed to her.5  To do this is to see in effect the extent to which this individual is 
acting in accordance with the same attitudinal and behavioral constraints to which we 
                                                 
5 I mean this to be an intuitive and almost trivial description of how we make sense of ourselves and each 
other all the time in our daily activities.  It is not meant to carry any theoretical baggage, though those who 
are familiar with the works of certain philosophers can see, of course, the resonance of this characterization 
with their views.    
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would normally be sensitive and take into account in the circumstances under 
consideration.  (Wittgenstein’s toy example concerning the process by which we teach 
and discern whether a pupil can properly count numbers illustrates this nicely.6)  This is 
at least one common way, though by no means the only way, in which we tend to make 
sense of what people believe and do, and hence who they are, by discerning the extent to 
which they are sensitive to and follow the same rules that we would in similar 
circumstances.  Rule-following in this sense is inherently connected with our ability to 
make sense of each other and ourselves in everyday life.  It is a constitutive, not an 
optional, aspect of human understanding in general because it underlies and informs the 
very manner in which we make sense of anything at all.   
From a more theoretical angle: Rule-following in the relevant sense has to do with 
the appropriate criteria by which we should distinguish artificial and merely biological 
entities that are disposed to respond reliably and discriminately to their environments 
(e.g., elevators and dogs) from human beings, who as far as we know are the only 
creatures who respond to their environment in the mode of understanding (in a sense to 
be explicated below).  Naturalists, in the sense of those who believe that the methodology 
of the natural sciences suffices for the understanding of everything, may already find this 
view to be contentious.  But for nonnaturalists like Pettit and Brandom, the issue of rule-
following is crucial because they consider it to be a necessary aspect of how we can and 
should distinguish (in Pettit’s terminology) merely “intentional systems” from genuinely 
“thinking intentional systems”, or (in Brandom’s terminology) entities or organisms that 
are merely “sentient” in the sense of being disposed to respond reliably and 
discriminately to their environment from those that are “sapient” in the sense of being 
directed at their environment in the mode of understanding.  In other words, their claim is 
that if we are to understand adequately what is distinctive of rational animals like us, 
philosophical reflection can make a contribution to this project by examining our specific 
mode of directedness at the world.  An important motivation, then, for the philosophical 
attention to rule-following is demarcational: How should we distinguish entities that do 
not understand in the relevant sense from those that do?  It must be said immediately that 
                                                 
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen: Werkausgabe, Band I (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1984), §§143ff. 
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this demarcational concern is not motivated by the (futile and silly) wish to return to a 
premodern worldview in which the human being was regarded, metaphysically speaking, 
as the center of the universe.  Rather, it is motivated by the attempt to understand in 
effect what it is to be distinctively human.  If one is interested in a project of this sort, the 
nature of rule-following becomes significant because it helps us get clearer about the 
distinctiveness of the sort of understanding of the world that human beings achieve.  
These remarks should suffice hopefully in giving us at least some sense why 
contemporary analytic philosophers have become interested in understanding the nature 
of rule-following.  To put it simply, rule-following is of interest to them because they 
regard it as crucial to obtaining the adequate understanding of the conditions of 
intentionality in general, of what it is to be minded (to have a mind) at all.   
Skepticism may exist, however, about whether we can indeed follow rules, i.e., be 
sensitive to norms and (try to) act in accordance with them in the sense specified above.  
Thanks in particular to Winch’s and Kripke’s readings of Wittgenstein, we can 
characterize the apparent problem about rule-following as follows.  Given our finite 
conceptual capacities, it seems mysterious upon reflection how creatures like us can 
indeed come to act in accordance with norms that are suppose to govern over an infinite 
variety of cases or situations.  More precisely, rule-following seems puzzling for two 
closely connected reasons: 
(1) The problem of underdetermination: Any finite sequence of examples of whatever sort can instantiate 
infinitely many different rules (cf. Kripke’s Wittgenstein on our inability, e.g., to determine whether 
someone is following the rule of addition, in each case of its application, rather than, say, that of 
quaddition).  How, then, can we tell if someone is actually following some determinate rule rather than 
some other rule(s)?  No finite sequence of cases as such enables us to determine what rule someone is 
actually following because it can be made to accord with any other rule.7   
(2) The problem of normativity: A rule seems incapable of really determining or guiding, all on its own, the 
putative rule-follower such that she can be judged as following the rule correctly or incorrectly.  As 
Wittgenstein states, if acting according to a rule can be made to accord with any other rule, it becomes 
mysterious how any rule of any sort can ever come to govern any course of action at all, let alone future 
ones?    
 
Although the problem of underdetermination may well be prior in the order of exposition 
of what is at issue with regard to rule-following, the problem of normativity is more basic 
                                                 
7 Ibid., §201: “Unser Paradox war dies: eine Regel könnte keine Handlungsweise bestimmen, da jede 
Handlungsweise mit der Regel in Übereinstimmung zu bringen sei.  Die Antwort war: Ist jede mit der 
Regel in Übereinstimmung zu bringen, dann auch zum Widerspruch.  Daher gäbe es hier weder 
Übereinstimmung noch Widerspruch.” 
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in the order of explanation.  For if it is unintelligible how any rule or norm can actually 
determine any past, present, or future course of action at all, it becomes a pointless 
exercise to consider whether the rule or norm in accordance with which someone – and 
now we must say: putatively – acts can be made to accord with other rules or norms.  If 
we cannot see how a rule can indeed govern or constrain us at all, there is no point in 
worrying about whether the rule according to which one acts may also be instantiating 
other rules.  In short, if the problem of rule-following is not satisfactorily resolved, the 
very idea of rule-governedness, of trying to act in accordance with normative constraints 
that determine the correctness or incorrectness of one’s thoughts and actions in given 
situations, would vanish; normativity would thus be unmasked as illusory.   
 
 
II. Pettit and Brandom on Rule-Following 
 
How do Pettit and Brandom resolve this apparent problem?  Their resolutions can be seen 
as working out, albeit in highly systematic and elaborate ways, Wittgenstein’s reminder 
that obeying a rule is a practice.  The understanding of rule-following that Wittgenstein 
finds objectionable is the intellectualist one that construes following a rule as always 
involving the appeal to some other explicit rule or principle (“Deutung”).8  Rather, he 
wants to remind us that while normativity bottoms out at the end of our explanations in 
unreflective action, this bedrock of unreflective action remains nonetheless norm-
involving.9 
                                                 
8 Ibid., §§201f., emphases in the original except where noted: “Daß da ein Mißverständnis ist, zeigt sich 
schon darin, daß wir in diesem Gedankengang Deutung hinter Deutung setzen; als beruhige uns eine jede 
wenigstens für einen Augenblick, bis wir an eine Deutung denken, die wieder hinter dieser liegt.  Dadurch 
zeigen wir nämlich, daß es eine Auffassung einer Regel gibt, die nicht eine Deutung ist; sondern sich, von 
Fall zu Fall der Anwendung, in dem äußert, was wir >der Regel folgen<, und was wir >ihr 
entgegenhandeln< nennen. ... Darum ist >der Regel folgen< eine Praxis [my emphasis – JJK].  Und der 
Regel zu folgen glauben ist nicht: der Regel folgen.”    
9 Ibid., esp. §§211, 217-19, 241-42, 289.  It must be noted, however, that Wittgenstein himself seems to use 
the concept of rule in different ways.  For an attempt to distinguish the different senses of ‘rule’ in 
Wittgenstein’s text, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, op. cit., pp. 64-6; for a forceful critique in turn of 
Brandom’s reading and appropriation of Wittgenstein in general, see John McDowell, “How not to read the 
Philosophical Investigations: Brandom’s Wittgenstein”, in R. Haller and K. Puhl (eds.), Wittgenstein and 
the Future of Philosophy: Akten des 24. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-
Tempsky, 2002), pp. 251-62. 
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 Pettit explicitly calls his resolution an ethocentric account of rule-following in 
order to emphasize its basis and articulation in terms of habits of extrapolation and 
practices of negotiation.10  Specifically, it turns on the satisfaction of three conditions, 
which he argues to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an activity to count 
as genuine rule-following.  They are: (1) independent identifiability, (2) direct 
readability, and (3) fallible readability.  Independent identifiability consists simply in the 
ability of the rule-follower to pick out and act in accordance with the rule on the basis of 
exemplifications, as opposed to instantiations, of the rule in question.  This consists in the 
capacity of the rule-follower to be disposed simply to extrapolate from the exemplars and 
respond in a certain way when she finds herself in a given situation independently of any 
other similar occasions of extrapolation and response.11  Direct readability is our capacity 
precisely to know how to act without any recourse to some explicit rule or principle of 
action that allegedly serves as an intermediary (Deutung) between the situation in which 
we find ourselves and knowing how to act in accordance with the relevant rule.12  Pettit 
thinks that humans share these two specific capacities with many other creatures.  In 
Brandom’s terminology, the capacities for independent identifiability and direct 
readability are more or less what an entity needs to be able to do in order for it to count as 
having “reliable discriminate responsive dispositions”.13   
 These two capacities, however, do not suffice for genuine rule-following.  The 
reason is that it must be possible for any candidate rule-follower, for all she knows, to 
make mistakes in her attempt to follow a rule in any particular circumstance.  In other 
words, the rule-follower, in order to count genuinely as one, must be fallible in her rule-
following activities.  The possibility of fallibility is significant for both Pettit and 
Brandom because it is, in the final analysis, this possibility in our rule-following which 
makes objectivity possible, i.e., the ability on our part to get the world right or wrong, and 
                                                 
10 Pettit, The Common Mind, op. cit., pp. 93, 177.   
11 Ibid., p. 87: “Suppose, as is generally allowed, that the agent forms a disposition or inclination to 
extrapolate in one direction rather than another from any set of putative exemplars of a rule.  Given the 
inclination supposed, the examples presented will exemplify the corresponding way of going on, the 
corresponding rule of response, for the agent.  They will make that rule salient.” 
12 Ibid., p. 88.  
13 Brandom, Making It Explicit, op. cit., esp. ch. 4, pp. 214-21; idem., “The Centrality of Sellars’s Two-Ply 
Account of Observation to the Arguments of ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’”, in Tales of the 
Mighty Dead, op. cit., esp. pp. 349-53.   
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it is our possibility to be directed at the world from within this normative dimension that 
makes room for the objectivity that distinguishes us rational animals from nonrational 
ones.  Now the rule-follower’s capacity to be fallible depends, according to Pettit, on the 
extent to which the circumstances in which she exercises this capacity are favorable.  
Favorable conditions are, more specifically, the normal and ideal conditions that set the 
standard by appeal to which other rule-followers, herself included perhaps at some later 
time, can judge whether her attempt to follow the rule in question is successful or not.14  
For it is only once such standards are in place that it becomes intelligible at all to evaluate 
the extent to which rule-following is successful or not, i.e., correctly or incorrectly 
carried out.   
The subject takes certain examples to exemplify a particular rule, given the inclination that they generate.  
The subject reads off that rule in new cases ... letting the inclination speak for how it should go on.  But the 
subject does this without any basis for ruling out the possibility of error, for it allows that negotiation with 
itself across time, or negotiation with other subjects, may establish that the circumstances that prevail in 
any reading are not favourable and that its response under those circumstances is mistaken.  However 
direct, therefore, the subject’s reading of the rule is nonetheless fallible. ... The important point is that the 
subject gives a certain role to negotiation about discrepancies across time and persons.  It must make 
appropriate assumptions about intertemporal and interpersonal constancy. ... If the subject does behave in 
this way, then the theorist will recognize that the rule exemplified for the subject by certain examples, the 
rule it tries to follow, is not whatever rule corresponds to the inclination engendered by those examples; 
rather it is the rule that corresponds to the inclination under circumstances that survive negotiation: under 
circumstances that are, in the ethocentric sense, normal or ideal.15 
 
It is thus on the basis of these practices of negotiation, both as carried on by the 
subject with himself and with other subjects, that the fallibility of rule-following, and 
hence normativity and ultimately objectivity, becomes not only intelligible but really 
possible.  Rule-following is therefore an essentially interactive enterprise because one 
must either interact/negotiate with oneself or with others in order to equip oneself to 
move within this normative dimension and hence genuinely to think about and 
understand the world at all.  Note also that rule-following need not and primarily and 
mostly does not take place in an explicit or self-conscious way; the rule-follower 
(echoing Wittgenstein’s reminder) may follow the rule “blindly” in the sense that while 
he may not be able to give justifications for why he follows the rule in the way that he 
does, he still engages in his practices as answering to normative constraints.16  
                                                 
14 Pettit, The Common Mind, op. cit., pp. 93-4. 
15 Ibid., pp. 94-5, emphases added. 
16 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
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The connection between practice and sociality should be apparent by now in this 
sketch of Pettit’s view.  The basic argument is that social interaction is a constitutive 
requirement for, not something optional to, what it is to be able in general to follow rules, 
i.e., to be sensitive to and try to act in accordance with norms.  For it is only in virtue of 
this sort of interaction/negotiation that one can act in such a way that there is a genuine 
difference between acting correctly and incorrectly, and hence acting according to rules 
or norms at all.  Although there may still be a hypothetical possibility in principle that 
acting under normative constraints is available for a solitary but merely intertemporally 
interactive subject,17 the nature of our rule-following is such that I am in actual practice 
not only concerned with the correctness of my rule-following, but equally with that of 
yours and the degree to which it converges with mine.   
You view a discrepancy in our responses with just the same degree of seriousness as a discrepancy in your 
own responses over time.  You give my responses the same presumptive relevance and authority as you 
give your own responses, so that I am as intimately involved in your rule-following intentions and project 
as your other selves.18 
 
Pettit’s outlook here converges strikingly with that of Brandom’s, which I shall 
now outline in the respect that is relevant for our purposes.  At the heart of Brandom’s 
ambitious project is the idea that rule-following, and hence normativity and objectivity, is 
only possible on the basis of our engagement in what he calls social deontic scorekeeping 
practices.19  First, Brandom, appropriating Wittgenstein’s insight, argues that normativity 
must be conceived in terms of its expression in practices in order to dissolve the problem 
of rule-following.  The emphasis on practice avoids the problem that plagues what 
Brandom calls “regulism”, which insists that all rules or norms must derive their 
normative force from other explicit rules or principles.  The problem with regulism is that 
it cannot avoid collapsing into a vicious infinite regress, for rules are not self-applying 
and can ultimately only guide us against a prior background understanding of how to 
apply them.  But this background understanding cannot in turn be rendered perspicuous 
                                                 
17 Simon Blackburn, “The Individual Strikes Back”, in Synthese 58 (1984), pp. 281-301.  
18 Pettit, The Common Mind, op. cit., p. 188.  But Pettit must concede that his line of argument cannot be 
“knock-down” because it is verificationist in the sense that it argues that it is a necessary condition of the 
possibility of rule-following that the latter take place within the medium of practices of negotiation.  This 
begs the question, however, that the skeptic (e.g., Blackburn) raises about the necessarily social nature of 
rule-following. 
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as explicit rules or principles.  The insistence on the practical character of rule-following 
acknowledges that there must be a way of grasping a rule that is not itself a Deutung in 
Wittgenstein’s sense.  It is only through our engagement in practices that there can be 
right or wrong concerning our sensitivity to and acknowledgment of norms even though 
they may not be capable of being made explicit. 
Second, these practices must be social and understood in terms of deontic 
scorekeeping because what it is to be directed at the world in normative terms, according 
to Brandom, depends crucially on our capacity to adopt three sorts of deontic, i.e., 
normative, attitudes towards a thinker (rule-follower, understander): (1) attributing a 
commitment to her, which Brandom takes to be the most basic deontic attitude; (2) 
attributing an entitlement to her; and finally, (3) undertaking or acknowledging the 
commitment oneself that one has attributed to the thinker in question.  Roughly speaking, 
attributing a commitment to someone amounts to ascribing to her some premise that she 
assumes or some conclusion that she draws in her reasoning; attributing an entitlement 
comes to ascribing to her the justifications that she puts forward to support her 
commitment; and acknowledging or undertaking the commitment oneself amounts to 
attributing to oneself the commitment that one has attributed to the thinker.  Note that 
adoption of these deontic attitudes are primarily and mostly implicit: Neither the 
individual attributing them nor the person to whom they are attributed need be self-
conscious or become explicitly aware that they are keeping score of one another’s deontic 
attitudes and hence deontic statuses.  These attitudes are deontic because they concern 
what one ought to hold or adopt as a premise or conclusion, as attributed or endorsed, in 
one’s reasoning in the game of giving and asking for reasons.  When individuals treat 
each other in terms of these deontic attitudes, they keep score practically on each other in 
the sense that there is a mutual monitoring, assessment, and, if appropriate, endorsement 
or rejection of the correctness of one another’s reasons for belief and action.  And these 
attitudes are articulated through practices, as far as adopting them constitutes performing 
actions or engaging in activities of a certain (discursively structured) sort.    
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Brandom, Making It Explicit, op. cit., esp. ch. 1-4 and 8.  For a more elaborate sketch of Brandom’s 
project than the one I offer here, see, e.g., David Lauer, “Pragmatics Corporealized: Zu Robert Brandoms 
Begriff sprachlicher Praxis”, in this essay collection.  
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Now Brandom, adapting Davidson’s line of thought20 for his purposes and putting 
it in term of his vocabulary, characterizes the sociality engendered through deontic 
scorekeeping as what he calls I-thou rather than I-we sociality in order to distinguish his 
particular conception of the significance of the social from other superficially similar 
communal assessment accounts of normativity.21  These latter accounts consider the 
assessments of the community as the ultimate arbiter of what counts as correct and 
incorrect as far as the rule-following of an individual is concerned.  According to them, 
the standard of assessment of the community itself can never be in turn questioned, since 
it is the ultimate set of normative constraints on the basis to which the rule-following of 
any individual is to be evaluated.  Brandom construes and criticizes this conception of the 
putatively infallible role of the community in assessment as an I-we conception.  I-we 
sociality is flawed because: (1) its conception of the relation between the individual and 
the community is a fiction; and (2) it illegitimately personifies the community by taking it 
to act as if it were an individual engaging in the activity of assessment.  And (3), most 
egregiously, the I-we sociality that characterizes these communal assessment accounts of 
normativity forfeits its right to claim to provide an account of objectivity, for by taking 
the authority of the community as infallible, it thereby forfeits its capacity to distinguish 
what is correct from what merely seems or is believed by the community to be correct.22  
For this reason Brandom rejects the I-we sociality that underlies these communal 
assessment conceptions of rule-following.  Rather, the sociality of deontic scorekeeping 
practices must be of an I-thou character because such practices can only take place in the 
first instance among individuals, not between an individual and the community of which 
he or she is a member.  Furthermore, since Brandom’s ultimate ambition is to show how 
his social practice account of normativity and hence intentionality in terms of social 
deontic scorekeeping practices makes objectivity possible, the sort of sociality expressed 
through scorekeeping practices must consist all the more of I-thou interactions because it 
is only by way of the different perspectives of each scorekeeper that the form of 
                                                 
20 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), esp. essays 
9-11, 18; idem., “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 
433-46. 
21 Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1980); Kripke’s 
reading of the later Wittgenstein in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, op. cit., ch. 3.     
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conceptual norms, i.e., the very idea of their normativity and objectivity überhaupt as 
opposed to their determinate content, can attain the deontic status of being objective.23  In 
any case, whatever one may think of Brandom’s provocative thesis regarding what can be 
characterized as his transcendental conception of objectivity as social institution, keeping 
score on one another’s discursive and hence attitudinal commitments and entitlements is 
conceived as the primary way in which we are social. 
In summary, both Pettit and Brandom conceive social practices to be central to 
grounding the necessarily normative and objective character of rule-following.  
Moreover, they both argue that the particular sort of sociality involved in rule-following 
must be of I-thou rather than I-we character.  For Pettit, the necessity of the social basis 
of rule-following is to be articulated in terms of the ethocentric account of rule-following 
as expressed through habits of extrapolation and practices of negotiation regarding what 
should count as the favorable (i.e., normal and ideal) conditions under which rules or 
norms in turn count as correctly or incorrectly applied.  The ethocentric account certainly 
seems at least to imply an I-thou sociality insofar as the relevant practices of negotiations 
take place among individuals, not directly between the individual and some community 
of which she is a member.  For Brandom, the necessarily social basis of rule-following is 
to be understood in terms of social deontic scorekeeping practices.  And the sort of 
sociality in play must be of I-thou rather than I-we character because the latter sort of 
sociality, apart from its fictional quality and illegitimate personification of the 
community, loses the very idea of objectivity that is constitutive of normativity as such 
by treating it as an infallible source of authority in assessment.  What comes to the 
foreground on the Pettit-Brandom construal of the nature of rule-following is its 
necessarily social and practical character.24  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Brandom, Making It Explicit, op. cit., pp. 37-42. 
23 Ibid., pp. 584-613, esp. 593-601. 
24 It should be noted, however, that Pettit and Brandom would disagree about the possibility of a solitary, 
though intertemporally interactive rule-follower.  Pettit, pace Blackburn, concedes that there is no way of 
ruling out this in principle possibility.  But if I understand Brandom correctly, he would seriously challenge 
the intelligibility of this possibility.  Because this issue is not directly relevant for my purposes in this 
essay, I need not settle it here.  I thank Julie Zahle for pointing out this divergence between Pettit and 
Brandom.     
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III. The Necessarily Worldly Character of Practice and Sociality 
 
But must the sociality of practice be essentially of an I-thou mode, one articulated 
foremost in terms of practices of negotiation or deontic scorekeeping?  More specifically, 
is I-thou sociality the most basic way in which human beings engage in social practices?  
Appropriating the line of thought of the early Heidegger and those inspired by him, such 
as Theodore Schatzki and Joseph Rouse, I submit that the answer to these questions 
should be in the negative.  More precisely, I want to suggest that practices are not just 
modes of activity, as Pettit and Brandom conceive them, but constitute at a more basic 
level the concrete context or world within which practices qua modes of activity are 
intelligible (verständlich) at all.25   
According to the conception of I-thou sociality that has been attributed to Pettit 
and Brandom, what is prior in the order of explanation is the activities of agents, whether 
as practices of negotiation (Pettit) or as scorekeeping qua the attributing of deontic 
attitudes (Brandom).  For it is the activities of agents above all that institute and sustain 
the normativity that governs rule-following and hence our way of being directed at the 
world in the distinctive mode of understanding.  What lies at the core of I-thou sociality 
is the idea of individual subjects who keep deontic score on each other’s commitments 
and entitlements from different perspectives and engage in negotiation about the 
correctness of attributing and undertaking these normative attitudes.  
But if there is a significant way in which the activities of agents institute and thus 
constitute human sociality, there is also a significant way in which that sociality in turn 
structures and thus makes intelligible/possible the activities of agents.  The relation of 
dependence between agents’ activities and the complex of intelligibility within which 
they live and act does not only run in one direction, with agents’ activities as the more 
basic element.  Rather, as we might say in adopting Heidegger’s terminology, both 
agents’ activities and the complex of intelligibility are equiprimordial or equioriginary 
(gleichursprünglich).  That is, neither is intelligible nor realizable absent its ultimate 
                                                 
25 Given the constraints on space in this essay, I can at best only make some suggestive critical remarks 
below about why I believe that the Pettit-Brandom conception of sociality is one-sided or deficient.  
Greater elaboration and argumentation would no doubt be required in order to entitle myself adequately to 
these remarks.   
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interdependence and hence unity with the other; they are “two side of one coin”, the 
“metal” of which constitutes the whole of human sociality.  
How does such a complex of intelligibility structure and thus make possible the 
activities of agents?  Here the thought of the early Heidegger about the constitutive 
existential structure of Dasein (human being) as being-in-the-world is significant.26  For 
Heidegger, the world is never only or even primarily the totality of entities that are 
“merely there”, i.e., merely intraworldly occurrent (innerweltlich vorhanden) in his 
terminology.  Rather, the world is primarily and mostly “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein 
as such ‘lives’”, a complex of intelligibility within which entities always already make 
sense to (and of) Dasein, who in turn embodies and actualizes determinately possible 
ways of dealing with them.27  The world in this sense is the most basic complex or 
context on the basis of which or in terms of which (Grundzusammenhang woraufhin) 
Dasein understands itself and its surroundings in engaging in its average everyday 
activities; it is the necessary condition of the possibility of Dasein’s ability to make sense 
of and deal with anything whatsoever.  The worldliness (Weltlichkeit) of the world is the 
ontological-existential structure that makes possible Dasein’s preontological-existentielle 
understanding of the unitary character of itself and the world.  The important point here is 
that Dasein necessarily has a world (in this sense) and is always already familiar with the 
world in which it lives and acts on account of its worldly way of being, i.e., on account of 
its antecedent understanding that discloses (erschließt) how everything hangs together 
intelligibly in the world.28  Thus, Dasein as being-in-the-world always already exists in a 
meaningfully configured complex (Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit) of (i) 
entities and (ii) people (iii) as situated in a determinate field of possibilities.  And in this 
meaningfully configured complex, i.e., the world wherein Dasein lives, Dasein has 
always already understood in some way or other the manner in which it exists with others 
(Mitsein unter Anderen): 
Im Mitsein als dem existenzialen Umwillen Anderer sind diese in ihrem Dasein schon erschlossen.  Diese 
mit dem Mitsein vorgängig konstituierte Erschlossenheit der Anderen macht demnach auch die 
Bedeutsamkeit, d. h., die Weltlichkeit mit aus, als welche sie im existenzialen Worum-Willen festgemacht 
                                                 
26 Since this is not the place to explicate Heidegger’s admittedly difficult conceptual apparatus, readers 
unfamiliar with it may wish to skim this paragraph.    
27 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 17th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993), §14, pp. 64-5.  This is 
‘world’ in the third, preontological-existentielle sense in Heidegger’s elaboration of the concept of world. 
28 Ibid., §18, pp. 86-8. 
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ist.  Daher läßt die so konstituierte Weltlichkeit der Welt, in der das Dasein wesenhaft je schon ist, das 
umsichtig Zuhandene so begegnen, daß in eins mit ihm als umsichtig Besorgtem das Mitdasein Anderer 
begegnet.29     
    
Both Schatzki and Rouse in their elaboration of the nature of social practices take 
up this Heideggerian conception of what is involved for agents to be in the world qua the 
meaningfully configured complex in terms of which entities and people always already 
hang together in a concrete intelligible arrangement.  Insofar as human agents are 
directed at all at the world, their intentionality must already practically take into account 
(among other things) how other agents’ activities and the entities they deal with mesh or 
hang together with their own.  Engagement in a particular set of social practices 
presupposes an understanding of the concomitantly meaningfully configured settings in 
terms of which those practices make sense as possible ways of acting at all.  For it is this 
complex of intelligibility that both enables and constrains the determinate field of 
possibilities on the basis of which concrete agents make sense of themselves and what 
they are doing.  This complex enables agents to act by equipping them with an 
understanding of how the various interrelated social practices and the entities caught up 
in them hang together.  It also constrains agents, however, precisely by initiating them 
into the rules and norms involved in those social practices whenever they engage in them.  
For example, someone who understands what it is to give a talk at a colloquium has a 
practical understanding of his role and how it relates to other people’s roles in such a 
setting, of how to use the equipment that belongs to and makes sense within this setting, 
of its aims and associated goals, and more generally of the rules and norms that both 
enable and constrain the actions and activities of agents who find themselves situated in 
this setting.  As Schatzki writes: 
When a practice, as is usually the case, is carried out in specific settings, the settings are set up to facilitate 
the efficient and coordinated performance of its constituent actions.  The layouts of the settings, as a result, 
reflect the interwoven meanings that the entities used in these actions possess by virtue of being so used 
(and talked about). ... The disclosure and layout of equipment within practices also, consequently, exhibits 
normativity, meaning that things are usually so arranged that they can be easily used in the correct and 
acceptable ways. ... Practices thus “constitute worlds” in the sense of articulating the intelligibility of 
nexuses of entities (objects, people, and events), specifying their normativized interrelated meanings.  
Constituting worlds through meaning does not, of course, bring entities into existence.  Instead, practices, 
by conferring upon entities interrelated meanings coordinate with the actions taken toward them, organize 
entities into the integrated nexuses that are what reality is and can be for us.30 
                                                 
29 Ibid., §26, p. 123, emphases added. 
30 Theodore Schatzki, Social Practices, op. cit., p. 114f.; see also idem., The Site of the Social, op. cit., esp. 
ch. 1-2.  
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Similarly, Rouse writes: 
Practices are ... not just what agents do but the relational complex within which their doings are intelligible.  
The agents who engage in practices thus belong to the practice [sic], rather than the reverse.31 
 
The central claim is that the meaningfulness of agents’ situation is not bestowed by either individual 
comportment or by social norms in abstraction from their material realization; instead, it emerges from the 
ongoing interaction of agents with their material surroundings and with one another.  The situation in which 
agents find themselves is already meaningful, not because meaning is grounded in natural causality but 
because agents are always responding to the specific configuration of meaningful possibilities for action 
which emerges from past practice.32 
 
I am now in the position to register my moderate criticism of the Pettit-Brandom 
conception of the connection between practice and sociality as essentially of an I-thou 
character.  On the Pettit-Brandom picture, the order of explanation moves from the 
activities of agents to what their activities institute and hence constitute.  But on the 
picture of the connection between practice and sociality that Schatzki and Rouse work 
out, social practices refer not only to the activities of agents, but encompass the 
meaningfully configured complex that is equioriginary (gleichursprünglich) to the 
intelligibility of agents’ activities.  In order to understand the delicate nature of this 
equioriginarity, the distinction needed is that between availability (potentiality) and 
actuality.  As argued above, social practices must presuppose the prior availability of the 
background understanding that renders intelligible the activities of agents and the entities 
caught up in them.  But in order for social practices to be actual (actualized) and not 
merely possible qua intelligible ways of being in the world, agents must engage in them 
by actually dealing with the entities and the other agents that are implicated in those 
practices.  Thus, the activities of agents and the complex of intelligibility are 
interdependent (they are two sides of one coin) in the sense that they determine each 
other modally.  In order for social practices to be intelligible as possible ways of acting at 
all, their complex of intelligibility must be antecedently available.  But in order for this 
complex to become something actual (actualized), agents must actually engage in the 
                                                 
31 Rouse, Engaging Science, op. cit., p. 143.  The inference in this context that agents who engage in 
practices “thus belong to the practice” is in my view too strong and hence unwarranted.  Agents and 
practices belong to each other, albeit in different modes of belongingness, with neither having priority over 
the other (see below in the text).  Rouse’s “posthumanist” commitments blind him perhaps to this delicate 
point.  For a sympathetic critique of Rouse’s anti- or posthumanism, see Schatzki, The Site of the Social, 
pp. 105-22. 
32 Rouse, Engaging Science, op. cit., p. 152; see also idem., Knowledge and Power, op. cit., pp. 58-68. 
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relevant social practices.  The equioriginarity of the activities of agents and the complex 
of intelligibility of those activities is connected with their respective modality.    
There is a place, then, in the practice-centered account of sociality for practices of 
negotiation or deontic scorekeeping, for engaging in them is indeed necessary for 
actualizing the way in which we coexist with each other.  But the question is whether the 
sort of sociality that these activities express can fully account for the sort of practice-
centered sociality that the early Heidegger, and following him Schatzki and Rouse, are 
concerned to emphasize and elaborate.  If this latter conception of the connection 
between practice and sociality is correct, practices of negotiation or deontic scorekeeping 
can only make sense at all if the complex of intelligibility within which they take place is 
already disclosed (erschlossen) and available to be appropriated.  That is, such practices 
or scorekeeping make sense as possible ways for agents to be and act at all only against 
the background of a meaningfully configured complex – a world – that is already familiar 
to them.  Practices of negotiation or scorekeeping cannot fully institute or constitute this 
background complex of intelligibility, since this complex is what conditions (enables and 
constrains) the former.  Sociality already figures in the constitution of this background 
complex of intelligibility, not only then when human beings begin to keep deontic score 
on one another or negotiate about the correctness of the score.33   
I conclude, therefore, that I-thou sociality as Brandom and Pettit conceive it 
cannot be the most basic, but is at best just one important aspect of the sort of sociality 
that characterizes human beings, if we think through fully the significance of sociality 
and its connection to practice.  Practice-centered sociality, I submit, is more basic than I-
thou sociality and constitutes the most fundamental way in which practice and sociality 
are interconnected. 
 
                                                 
33 John McDowell expresses sympathy for this criticism in “Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and 
Relativism”, in J. Malpas, U. Arnswald, and J. Kertscher (eds.), Gadamer’s Century (Cambridge, Mass. 
and London: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 173-93, esp. pp. 187-90.  
